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“Whither Canfor? – Part 2 – Blood in the Water”

By Peter Ewart

Thursday, May 03, 2007 03:50 AM

    
“Oh the shark has pretty teeth dear
And he shows them pearly white
Just a jack-knife has MacHeath dear
And he keeps it out of sight.”
- from Mack the Knife by Kurt Weill and Bertolt Brecht

As discussed in the first instalment of this series of articles (“Whither Canfor, Part 1 – The Battle for Control”) the New York based Third Avenue Management group (TAM), has become a major shareholder in British Columbia’s forest industry with stakes in Canfor, Catalyst Paper, TimberWest, and Abitibi Consolidated.

What do we know about this powerful investment company that is gliding like a shark through the forest industry of the province?  We can see its fin, but what about the rest of the beast?  What are its methods and what are its aims?  These are questions that people in forest based communities are starting to ask.

TAM was founded by Marty Whitman, an 82 year old New York financeer and university professor.  Whitman got his start in the investment industry as, he describes it,  “a grossly overpaid bankruptcy professional” (Brian Zen, Gurufocus.com, Feb. 21, 2006).  Today, he has achieved “legendary” status in the funding industry as a financial whiz, his companies having investments in industries around the world worth billions of dollars. 

But Whitman is not one to flaunt his wealth.  He often comes to work wearing worn sneakers and socks with holes in them, carry an “old and saggy polyester school bag.”  Indeed, some might “mistake this super-investor as a street person”.  However, this is one “street person” who has become famous for “picking over the balance sheets of troubled companies in search of hidden treasures” (Gurufocus, Feb. 21, 2006).

TAM is a modern-day kind of “hedge fund” that invests “opportunistically” in industries around the world.  Hedge funds are a “U.S. born investment innovation” that have become a $1 trillion industry - but not without controversy.  One way to describe a hedge fund is as a kind of “mutual fund for the super-rich” but one which has “far more flexibility in its investment strategies.”  It is open only to “sophisticated” very wealthy investors and often uses “high-risk techniques” in order “to make extraordinary capital gains” (Answers.com). 

Whitman himself entered the industry (through a hostile takeover) because, in effect, he saw the mutual fund business as an opportunity and, in his own blunt terms, a “license to steal”.  That being said, the straight talking Whitman is said to be “honest and forthright to the core” (Gurufocus.com, Feb. 21, 2006)

Whitman’s technique is to search out industries, like the BC Forest industry, and companies, like Canfor, that are “bleeding in the water” so to speak, and are “priced below their intrinsic values.”  He especially likes companies that are “safe and cheap.”  Now some business writers describe a company like TAM as a “vulture investor” (Fred Frailey, Kiplinger’s, July 1999); but others might describe it simply as a “lean, mean financial machine” seeking good investment value.  Few would deny that it is effective at what it does.

Like MacHeath in the song “Mack the Knife,” community responsibility and social conscience are not something TAM highlights about itself.  Make no mistake about it, TAM means business, declaring that its investments have “the sole objective of delivering superior returns [to our investors] with limited investment risk, over the long term.”  In its pursuits, TAM claims that it is “indifferent to” and “not constrained by sectors, industries … and countries.”  If this means closing down operations, breaking up companies, or selling them off, so be it.  In one famous interview, Whitman is said to have commented: “As for dealing with the public, and you may quote me, screw ‘em.”

But it should be noted, TAM does provide superior returns and has established a track record “of approximately 17% per year since 1990” - for TAM’s wealthy investors, that is.

Some, like Rich Coleman, BC’s Minister of Forests, say that the fact that a foreign based hedge fund is gaining a monopoly interest in a key resource like the BC forest industry is simply “the private market place at work” and not much to be worried about.  After all, this is the system of monopoly capital and that is how it works.  The strong survive and the weak go under.  In the long run, everyone prospers, or so the song goes.

But all of this is not much comfort for the forestry dependent communities of the province, who are treading water, and can see the sleek fins circling ever closer.

“Whither Canfor – Part 3”, which is the next article in this series, will be published in the Thursday, May 10th, edition of Opinion250.  Peter Ewart can be reached at: peter.ewart@shaw.ca or phone (250) 962-6792.

    


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Comments

Well Marty may have met his match with Canfor. There is no quick fix for it or any other large forestry corporation that has listened to the siren song of accountants (isn't that an image!) and built huge centralized mills. Jim Shepherd knew the the folly of this strategy and he is gone. The problem is that transportation costs are just too high. When the industry is already paying up to 50% of its raw material bill in trucking, and given the increases in fuel bills coming down the pike, its easy to see that the corporate dream of large and effecient(few workers), centralized(far from log sources) sawmills won't work any more. The only way anyone can make this pig fly is if the corporations get so big as to become a cartel or monopolize local markets. The real answer is a return to smaller, local mills with up to date technology.
"The real answer is a return to smaller, local mills with up to date technology."

I think that is certainly a solution which should be explored. It makes a lot of sense.

As I have said before, it is interesting to view waht is curretnly happening in the forest industry in BC in the context of "sustainable forestry practices" both from the biological and socio-economic aspects.

It is beginning to look more and more that we have not been practicing sustainable forestry.
Herbster I like the way you think, and agree with your comments 100%
Also I hope that 'plain old Marty' stays in NYC leave us alone. We have enough industry around here already that is run out of a boardroom back east.
metalman.
It would be interesting to know who the **Investors** are for TAM. Is it possible that this outfit is fronting for someone who wants to take over Canfor and Privatize it??

Jim Pattison is no fool, and is close to the same age as old Marty. He would not be so stupid as to see his investments being eroded by this company. If I was a betting man I would suspect that there is more to this story than meets the eye.

Pattison and the Bentleys own approx 50% of Canfor and I would suspect that Pattison would like to increase his share.

Supposed to be a big announcement to-morrow so we might see where the bear s--- in the buckwheat.
bankruptcy professional - HUGE RED FLAG

I don't trust any former bankruptcy professional in business. One look at BC based 360 Networks and the liquidation of its $24 Billion in equity and a person can see what happens when a bankruptcy specialist is hired to the top spot and relied upon to make a turn around.

Bankruptcy specialists make their money in devaluing assets so as to use the courts to liquidate their debt obligations and take the company private with little or no debt at which time they can use a clean balance sheet to preditory price and acquire their competition.

In the case of 360 networks they devalued a global $7 billion dollar fiber optic mesh network riviled by no other in the world to a mere $250 million, which coincidentally was the amount of secured debt owed to JP Morgan Chase, who then aquired the whole company just as the network was completed.

Bankers like to lend secure debt to high value assets and then sink them with unsecured bond offerings so as to acquire the entire asset class for pennies on the dollar at a later date. No different then todays developing housing crisis.

The new private 360 Networks paid cash to buy out Global telecom in Atlantic Canada for $250 million before they were even out of bankruptcy court in the BC Supreme Court (cash that could have avoided bankruptcy) and then acquire no less then a dozen other telecoms as a private entity in the following 2-years after discharge.

The bankruptcy specialist they brought on as the CEO pre-bankruptcy recieved 15% of the company for successfully steering it through bankruptcy court stripping the investors that paid to build the $7 Billion dollar network of their $24 Billion in equity. The courts ruled in favour of the rights to the employees and the company customers not to have their employment and services disrupted by liquidation, and not in favour of equity holders or unsecured debt holders.

Canfor will be no different if run by a bankruptcy specialist and his appointments. Hence the need to seperate saw mills from the profitable pulp mills.

The first to enter bankruptcy in the BC Supreme Court will be the first to consolidate the industry under their ownership as a private enterprise IMO.

how can we go back to small mills when we have hundreds of thousands of cubic metres of wood that will be rotting from the pine beetle?