Meisner and Mair Were Not Alone
Friday, July 13, 2007 03:44 AM
Editor’s Note:
It is important to note as you read this article from Dr Gordon Hartman, the accomplishments of this man. He is not vain, and if you think you will get a list of his very many accomplishments, you won’t. During his life he has, "just gone about his business." He has consulted fisheries issues in a number of foreign countries to help them contribute to the well being of that resource. Leading fishery scientists all over the world will attest to his knowledge and ability.
He was raised in the area of Vanderhoof, Fraser Lake, and (like me) has a deep passion for the Nechako River.
He is not driven by some carrot hanging on the end of a string, but rather driven by a sense of what is right.
-Ben Meisner
***************
In the Prince George Citizen, July 5, 2007, Bruce Strachan produced an article in connection with the flooding in Vanderhoof. The article seemed to have two thrusts. On one hand, it seemed to focus much of the blame for events that led to rejection of the 1987 Settlement Agreement, and recent floods in Vanderhoof, on Ben Meisner and Rafe Mair. On the other hand, he extolled the virtues of the 1985 Settlement Agreement. This was an agreement that would have left the Nechako River, upstream from the Nautley River, with only 13% of its pre-Kenney Dam flow.
I put a great deal of work into the Kemano Completion issue and the Nechako River Council effort. In most respects I want little more to do with the whole, sorry, politically driven business. However, Mr. Strachan’s lamentable lack of understanding of the ecological implications of the Settlement Agreement flows and the inadequacy of the fish mitigation measures brings me back to it.
First, it is unfair to suggest that some great share of the blame for the rejection of the Kemano Completion Project on Mr. Meisner and Mr. Mair. There was much more involvement than that of Ben Meisner and Rafe Mair in that history, great as their efforts were. Four scientists, one biologist, and one senior manager, all from DFO, appeared at the B.C. Utilities Commission Review (BCUCR) in opposition to the biological and hydrological elements that were within the set of fish protection measures in the Settlement Agreement. A strong group of citizen’s organizations were deeply concerned about the deal.
The flaws in the measures for fish protection were many, and the process in the 1987 agreement to which Mr. Strachan refers (his paragraph 6) was shoddy. The program of measures to provide and “acceptable level of certainty” of protecting Chinook salmon was worked out over a four day weekend by a group of DFO scientists and consulting biologists, Alcan’s and other. There are no formal note from that process.
The flows that were to form the basis of the measures in the Settlement Agreement, were the flows sought all along by Alcan. The Minister had, shortly before the agreement, rejected the flows recommended by DFO’s Kemano Task Force. He accepted and ordered the use of Alcan’s flows in the settlement process. He did this even though the Kemano Task Force was a group of DFO scientists assembled by DFO. He did this even though this Task Force, assembled in 1985, had worked carefully for months on the establishment of safe flows for salmon. This group and its work were sidelined.
In a meeting in Vanderhoof, on May 26, 1990, I reviewed much of the process that led to the establishment of the 1987 Settlement Agreement. At the time of this meeting, most people were unaware of the deficiencies in the 1987 Settlement Agreement process. Later, in my presentation to the BCUCR (Hartman 1993), I reviewed the deficiencies in the program of measure to provide the “acceptable level of certainty” for salmon protection and conservation. The mitigation measures that were proposed for young Chinook were those that would have applied in regard to coho salmon winter habitat requirements in a coastal stream. The stream flow modeling work was badly flawed. The flow regime would not have provided thermal protection for salmon down-river. Furthermore, I was not alone in my concerns. At the BCUCR, five other DFO professionals presented evidence for their concerns about, and objections to, the Settlement Agreement flows and the fish protection measures in it.
Near the end of his article, Mr. Strachan makes the following comment with which I have great difficulty, “In fact, canceling the project has had a negative impact in the fishery.” What scientific proof does he have for such a statement? Let us have an analysis that would stand up in science. Let us have something more than a one-line opinion.
I have briefly reviewed some of these matters to show that the process leading to the 1987 Settlement Agreement was politically driven, did not use the scientific advice provided by the Kemano Task Force, and involved un-proven mitigation measures. Mr. Meisner, Mr. Mair, and the many others, were correct in challenging the deal. There was much that was wrong with it.
If people are interested in revisiting the whole sorry Kemano chapter of resource management in B.C., they should read not only the 259 page BCUCR, but also the 378 page Task Force Report, plus the BCUCR submissions from DFO scientists who had the courage to speak out for the fish and the river. For more recent discussion, they might read my peer-reviewed paper in the GeoJournal (Vol. 40, No. 2, 1996). As far as the collection of circumstances behind recent flooding Vanderhoof go, Mr. Meisner (Opinion 250, July 9) has already discussed them.
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Will we ever see factual science predominate over political rhetoric? Will monetary gain ever take second place to sound management of our natural resources?