On the Electoral Boundaries Commission

By Submitted Article

 – By Peter Ewart & Dawn Hemingway

This is the third part  in a series leading up to the Electoral Boundaries Commission’s hearing in Prince George on the proposed changes to the  ridings in the province. 

Part 1- Arbitrary Recommendations that Disenfranchise the North"     Part Two: "The Super Ridings of the North"

The Electoral Boundaries Commission, in its Report on setting riding boundaries in British Columbia for the provincial legislature, wants to have its cake and eat it, too.  On the one hand, it relies heavily on the regional characteristics of the various parts of the province to develop and inform its analysis and make decisions about riding boundaries.  On the other hand, when it comes down to make exceptions about ridings, especially those in rural areas, it argues that regional considerations should not be a factor. 

There appears, to say the least, to be many holes and contradictions in its arguments.  Indeed, the very background material that it uses in its Report to support its conclusions can just as easily be used to oppose these conclusions.  In addition, the Commission appears to thumb its nose at the very tasks the Legislature laid down for it in its work.

Furthermore, far from being “limited” by legislation governing its mandate as it has suggested, the Commission appears to have unnecessarily imposed the limits on itself with its narrow interpretation of this very same legislation.  It even had the leeway to increase the number of MLAs in the province from 79 to 85.  But it decided not to take advantage of this option.

Throughout the report, the regional nature of British Columbia is acknowledged again and again.  For example, the commissioners endorse the view that the province can be described as a “region of regions” and that from a regional perspective BC is “unique …  within Canada” (52).  Indeed, the Commissioners remark, in their Report, that because of their meetings in various communities across the province, they “are unquestionably much more sensitive to the concerns of those rural British Columbians who do not want to lose their voices in Victoria”(17).

But it is precisely on this issue of regionalism, that the Commission got “buffaloed.”  As a result, the Report is confused and contradictory, and ends up with recommendations that work against the interests of the people of the North and other rural areas.  For example, at one point in its Report, the Commission says that, like all previous Boundaries Commissions and consistent with previous legislation, it has combined “individual electoral districts into regional groupings to assist in [its] analysis” (40).  However, it goes on to state that “at the end of the day a decision about whether ‘very special circumstances’ exist must be done at the individual district, not at regional level” (44). 

What this means in practice is that the North as a region, and other rural regions, are not to be considered as having “very special circumstances” because of terrain, size, weather, history, community of interest, etc.  Only individual ridings within the North can have that status.  Thus the Commission insists that most ridings in the North (with the exception of 2 out of 7) cannot deviate more than 25% from the provincial electoral quotient in population.  The result of this decision is that one riding must be removed from the North and other ridings must be super sized.

Why must decisions be only made at the “individual district” and not “regional level”?  Because, says the Commission, “the legislation under which we operate … instructs us to make our electoral boundary proposals on a district-by-district basis” (52).   But if we go over the material the Report itself presents on the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation of “the right to vote” or on the provincial “Electoral Boundaries Commission Act” of 2005 no such language appears to exist that limits the Commission in the way it describes.  Yes, the Commission has chosen to interpret the legislation in this narrow, constricted way, and not to recognize the unique, highly regionalized nature of the province.  But another Commission could just as easily interpret this issue much more broadly. 

For example, the Wood Commission of 1999, despite warning that a reduction in rural seats in BC may be inevitable in future years, developed 9 principles to guide its work, including Principle (1) “preserve regional representation as far as possible” in order to ensure “that its recommendations did not lead to the loss of an elected representative for any region of the province” and Principle (2) “take historic and geographic regions into account as much as possible” (30).

The Fisher Commission of 1988 followed similar guidelines regarding regions, including having “regard” for “historical and regional claims for representation” and “special geographic considerations including the sparsity or density of population of various regions, the accessibility to such regions or the size or shape thereof” (28).  Note that both Commissions specifically mentioned “regions” and “regional claims” as being valid considerations in determining representation.

The Report cites the “Dixon” ruling of Justice McLachlin (when she was chief justice of the BC Supreme Court) where she struck down provincial legislation that in the Court’s view went too far in giving special status to rural regions.  But the Report also cites her conclusions (after she had become a member of the Supreme Court of Canada) in the “Saskatchewan Reference case” which lean the other way in giving more latitude and leeway for rural regions. 

In this latter ruling, McLachlin, speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court, concluded that “the purpose of the right to vote enshrined in s.3 of the Charter [of Rights and Freedoms] is not equality of voting power per se, but the right to ‘effective representation’” (36).  By “effective representation”, she meant “factors like geography, community history, community interests and minority representation may need to be taken into account to ensure that our legislative assemblies effectively represent the diversity of our social mosaic” (37).  This means in practice that it is legitimate and not anti-democratic for rural and remote areas to have MLAs represent smaller populations than urban areas.  

In the Saskatchewan Reference case, the Saskatchewan government had instructed its electoral boundaries commission to divide the province into two parts, i.e., “north” and “south” and to allow the northern part to vary up to “50% from the provincial average” and allow the southern, more heavily populated, part to vary only 25% from the provincial average.  Clearly, the Saskatchewan government had divided the province into two distinct “regions,” and, unlike the BC Commission, was allowing regional considerations to influence decisions on individual ridings.  The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that this was, indeed, legal.

In any case, between the “Dixon” case in British Columbia and the “Saskatchewan Reference” case of the Supreme Court of Canada, you could drive some pretty big trucks through the loopholes.  The problem is, of course, that the BC Boundaries Commission has decided to limit their vehicle to a go-kart.  Even then it appears to drive off the road, especially when we look at the provincial government’s Throne Speech (Sept. 12, 2005) which laid down the tasks for the Commission’s work this time around.

The relevant section of the Throne Speech reads as follows:  “The new electoral boundaries commission will be given two tasks.  First, to draft the provincial electoral map, as is currently required.  The government will introduce an amendment that it hopes will protect northern representation in this legislature.  The amendment will allow the commission to provide for up to 85 members under the current electoral system.  Having decided on the most appropriate number of MLAs within that cap to protect northern residents, it will set its sights on STV.  The commission will also be asked to identify the best and fairest way to configure British Columbia’s electoral districts under the STV model” (321).

The tasks set by the Throne Speech are pretty clear in this excerpt and, in the case of protecting “northern representation” repeated twice.  That sounds very much like the North has “very special circumstances.”  Is it any wonder that a number of government MLAs were surprised to hear that, after all its deliberations, the Commission proposes to instead weaken “northern representation” by taking away ridings in the North, Cariboo and Kootenay regions?  What in God’s name, some have asked, was it thinking? 

It seems that the Commission didn’t give much weight to the Throne Speech excerpt in its placement of it.  Instead of having it front and center at the beginning of the Report (for example, on page 12, in the section entitled “Part 2 – The Role of the Commission” where it lays out the tasks the Legislature assigned it), the Commission buried the excerpt way back on page 321 in the section entitled “Part 10 – Proposed BC-STV Electoral System Boundaries.”  This would scarcely seem to be the appropriate place, given that the Throne speech excerpt was setting the tasks for both the “SMP”(i.e., the existing electoral system) and  “STV” ridings. 

In addition, the Commission sent out a large 16-page brochure to households in the North laying out the Commissions role, tasks, mandate, and maps of its final decisions.  Nowhere in this large brochure can the Throne Speech excerpt on protecting “northern representation” be found.

Why should such an important piece of information be buried near the end of the main report in what seems to be an inappropriate section?  Why isn’t it even included in the multi-page mailout to households?  Perhaps, something is being said about the priority the Commission attaches to it.  In any case, the Commission, in its Report and other materials, should have addressed frontally its differences with the Throne Speech and with the Legislature on the issue of northern representation.  But it chose not to.

There is no doubt that setting the boundaries of ridings in British Columbia is a difficult task.  The reality is that we live in a highly regionalized province with huge disparities between the heavily populated and urbanized southwest corner of the province and the vast rural areas in the Interior and North.  This is the unique reality that the Boundary Commission was to address in its deliberations.  But it has shrank from the task and ended up with a confusing and contradictory report that takes a narrow, dogmatic approach and makes worse the very problem it was charged with addressing by the Legislature – “protecting northern representation.”

Peter Ewart is a college instructor and Dawn Hemingway is a university professor.  Both are based in Prince George, BC,  and can be reached at: peter.ewart@shaw.ca

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